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Aspects Of Deconstruction:
Refuting Indeterminacy With One Bold Thought
by Anthony D'Amato*
85 Northwestern University Law Review, 113-118, Fall 1990

Abstract: Deconstruction has already happened on the Supreme Court. Not only can no member of the
Court really believe that "the law" (self-invented by the very Court it is supposed to govern!) can constrain
the result in any individual case, but its members have also convinced themselves that they have no time to
be concerned with dispensing justice to the parties. The justificatory legal language used in judicial
opinions is not what our law teachers told us it was. The justificatory legal language is not provided to
explain—much less constrain—the result in the case. Rather, it is a mode of couching the personal
legislative preferences of unelected judges in the publicly venerated language of a judicial decree.
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[p113]** If law is indeterminate, must it be so? Joseph Singer says no. There is a
possible legal system, he claims, in which law is completely determinate. Hence, he
argues, our own legal system could be determinate as well. FN1
What is Professor Singer's example of a completely determinate legal system? It
is: Consider a legal system with the rule "the plaintiff always loses."FN2 That, according
to Professor Singer, spells total determinacy. Kenneth Kress considers Singer's sentence
so irrefutable that he employs it as a throwaway line:
Although complete determinacy is attainable in a legal system (Singer considers
the rule: The plaintiff always loses), any completely determinate system .... FN3

This is one of those "although" throwaways that was a bit too hasty.
Professors Singer and Kress would have us believe that we can have a legal
system where the outcome of any case is totally determinate, because each and every
outcome is the same and known in advance—namely, the defendant wins and the plaintiff
loses. The point is of extreme importance to these professors and to similar-minded
doctrinalists. They must cite at least one hypothetical legal system that is clearly
determinate, or else risk allowing the camel's nose of indeterminacy into their tent.
However, Professors Singer and Kress have failed to consider what coherent or
even plausible meaning they can possibly give to the term "legal system" when the
system in question contains the single rule "plaintiff always loses." I would contend that
such a "system" is not and cannot possibly be a "legal system."
To show this, let us for the moment accept their "legal system" and consider its
consequences. If the plaintiff always loses, in practice nobody is going to want to be a
plaintiff. Thus, if you defraud me out of [p114] $1,000 of my money, I would not want
to be a plaintiff against you in court, because plaintiffs always lose. So instead I will buy
a gun and threaten to shoot you until you return my money. Suppose you go to court to
get a restraining order against me; no luck, because you will be a plaintiff and plaintiffs
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always lose. Suppose instead that you persuade the state to prosecute me for threatening
you with a gun. Too bad; the state is the plaintiff and so it loses also.
Now suppose that, emboldened by my successful physical assault against you, I
decide to embark on a career of robbing banks. I hire accomplices, we shoot our way into
banks, we take money; the state cannot prosecute any of us because plaintiffs always
lose. Soon everyone goes into the assault and robbery business. The police shoot to kill
because they have no incentive to arrest anyone; all court cases against arrested persons
are losers because the defendants always win. The scenario can be extended, but the
picture should be clear. In a word, it's anarchy. It is the entire absence of any law and
order; indeed, it is the absence of anything that can be called a "legal system."
Professors Singer and Kress have created total anarchy. True, it is determinate in
the sense that it is total anarchy. There is no doubt that redress in court is futile. But then,
in such a situation of chaos, there would be no "courts." The term "court" will be archaic,
because it is part of the conventional (though unnoticed) meaning of "courts" that at least
on some occasions plaintiffs will win.
Thus the rule "the plaintiff always loses" is a far cry from a throwaway line that
refutes the legal indeterminacy thesis. It is, instead, a shambles.
A similar attempt to refute indeterminacy in one bold stroke, this time by the use
of a statistic, is the demonstration of a low rate of dissenting opinions in present-day
judicial decisions. For example, two federal judges in their role as scholars have
examined a sampling of appellate decisions in federal courts, and found that dissents
were filed in less than four percent of the cases. FN4 They conclude that law is not so
indeterminate after all. Professor Ken Kress restates their conclusion: law cannot be
radically indeterminate in light of such certainty about the correct outcome.FN5 To drive
the point home he adds the standard homily that academics focus too much on
indeterminate cases in the classroom and in academic writing, and ignore the vast bulk of
routine litigation. "Belief in indeterminacy," he writes, "results in part from a bad diet."
FN6
[p115]Professor Kress does not understand legal indeterminacy; if he did, he
would see that it is law's indeterminacy—not determinate law—that produces a low rate
of dissent! Given the deconstructionist's view that law does not constrain a judge's ruling
in any given case, there is little point in dissenting. A decision in any case is reached by
the brute force of majority rule. The majority was not constrained by law to reach the
decision it reached, as the minority well knows. Hence there is nothing to be gained by
dissenting.
Not only is there nothing to be gained, but a dissent can be perceived as chipping
away at the court's legitimacy. Would-be dissenting judges probably are subjected to
collegial pressure to change their intended negative vote to a positive recorded vote, so
that the opinion of the court will appear less controversial, more authoritative, more
constrained by the law. This dynamic, I suggest, operates in all courts at all times and in
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all places. A judge who dissents too often is looked upon as a maverick, a non-team
player, a person who, for egotistic reasons, would erode the authority of the court by
unnecessarily challenging its wisdom in dissenting opinions.
Since recognition that law is indeterminate exposes the futility of filing a dissent,
the indeterminacy thesis would predict an eventual disappearance of judicial dissents.
The statistical question at present is not why a four percent dissenting rate is so low, but
rather why it is so high! One possible answer has been suggested by Professor Robert
Benson: some judges have simply fooled themselves into believing that law is
determinate, and therefore they write dissents out of the mistaken belief that what they
write could make a difference (perhaps to the Supreme Court, or to a future appellate
court in a similar case). FN7 If Professor Benson is correct, we should see the four
percent rate diminishing as judges shed their illusions as a result of their growing
awareness of deconstruction scholarship. The decline in dissenting opinions may even
accelerate because of an intellectual runaway effect. For the more that legal scholars talk
about deconstruction, the more that many judges—feeling a threat to their public
legitimacy—will attempt to produce the appearance of certainty. Judges may well join
together to discourage dissents.
One might object that my thesis does not explain why there is so much dissent in
the United States Supreme Court. The objection is in a sense ironic, for up to now the
proponents of legal indeterminacy have cited the cleavages on the Supreme Court as
proof of indeterminacy, whereas the doctrinalists have sought to explain the phenomenon
by pointing out that only the most indeterminate cases get to the Supreme [p116] Court in
the first place. I reject both of these arguments, and instead contend that the fact of
indeterminacy predicts increasingly fewer dissents; consequently, I accept the burden of
explanation. Since a full explanation, complete with citations to "authorities," would
comprise an entire article, I bequeath this task to anyone who might want to take it
up, and here simply outline my arguments.
The Supreme Court, I contend, is no longer a court that decides cases. It has
become in the last fifty or so years a legislative body which uses a case simply as a
serendipitous vehicle for enacting social legislation. This century has seen the
emasculation of the Court's original jurisdiction and the virtual elimination of its
appellate jurisdiction. Instead, the Court has become a certiorari Court. As a general
proposition, the Court grants certiorari to cases that four justices out of nine believe are
"important" in some sense or other (perhaps "interesting" might be a more descriptive
word). One does not have to be a deconstructionist to accept the proposition that the
vague certiorari standards do not constrain the Justices in deciding which cases they want
to hear. FN8
Nevertheless, the Court spends much of its time arguing over which petitions
should be granted certiorari. Since there are so many petitions, and so few can be granted,
the general practice has evolved that justice to individual litigants cannot be a significant
factor in granting certiorari. The Court is simply "too busy" to right individual wrongs.
No matter how unjustly a petitioner has been served by the courts below, the Supreme
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Court takes the attitude that the petitioner at least has had the benefit of judicial review,
and therefore the Supreme Court cannot waste its time granting one more review process.
The Court instead must husband its scarce resources to benefit society as a whole.
Having abandoned any sense of judicial duty toward individual litigants, the
"facts" of a case before the Supreme Court become supremely unimportant. The Court
does not have time to review the facts in any depth. Although a careful examination of
the facts would be essential to any court that wanted to render justice between the parties,
the Supreme Court's lack of interest in the facts of a case goes hand in hand with its
unwillingness to waste its time righting individual injustices.
To be sure, there are occasional Supreme Court opinions that delve deeply into
the facts of a case. But on close reading, these will be seen as attempts by the writer of
the particular opinion to categorize the case as one that should be "confined to its facts."
Of course, if the case was truly to be confined to its facts, then certiorari would never
have been granted; considering such a case would truly be an inefficient use of the
Court's resources. Instead, "confining a case to its facts" is simply a ploy to limit [p117]
the scope of the Court's legislative pronouncement emanating from the case at hand. Or,
more exactly, it is a ploy to undercut the authoritativeness of the legislative
pronouncements of the Justices who disagree with the opinion-writer and hold instead
that the case should not be confined to its facts.FN9
Having become institutionally disengaged from doing justice to the litigants based
on the facts of a case, the Supreme Court has become a legislative body that derives its
apparent authority from the mere appearance of deciding particular cases. I think that
each Justice is acutely aware of all of this, even though it is of course a forbidden subject
for public acknowledgement. For a Justice to admit that the facts of a case and the rights
of the parties are unimportant would undermine the public's confidence in the Court,
because the public still regards it as a "court" and not a legislature. If nevertheless the
public eventually catches on to what the Court is actually doing, public opinion may
force a reduction toward the rather limited adjudicatory role envisaged by the framers.
Simply put, what counts today is not what the Justices do but rather what they
say. They do not themselves care very much about what they do to the actual litigants
before them; individual justice has become irrelevant. FN10 But what they say has broad
legislative consequences. They can either expand or reduce Title Seven; they can expand
or reduce at will the Sherman and Clayton Acts; they can "interpret" what Congress says
any way they like; and on occasion they declare statutes unconstitutional. FN11 A "case"
is simply a convenient vehicle to justify this kind of errant social legislation. The Court's
power FN12 and public acceptability is very much a shrewd product of labelling its
legislative enactments "decisions." FN13
Given the reality of the Supreme Court's new institutional role as a legislator
rather than an adjudicator, it follows that individual Justices will use a panoply of
individual opinions, concurrences, and dissents, to publicize their own legislative
preferences. Given the further reality that what counts today is not what the Court does
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but rather what it says, it follows that individual Justices will try to say as much as
possible.FN14 The proliferation of individual opinions is a function of nine legislators in
black robes competing for legislative attention. It has nothing to do with changing
anyone's opinion as to the merits of the litigants' positions in any given case.
In brief, deconstruction has already happened on the Supreme Court—and with a
vengeance! Not only can no member of the Court really believe that "the law" (selfinvented by the very Court it is supposed to govern!) can constrain the result in any
individual case, but its members have also convinced themselves that they have no time
to be concerned with dispensing justice to the parties. The justificatory legal language
used in judicial opinions is not what our law teachers told us it was. The justificatory
legal language is not provided to explain—much less constrain—the result in the case.
Rather, it is a mode of couching the personal legislative preferences of unelected judges
in the publicly venerated language of a judicial decree. FN15
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FN 6 Id. A standard objection to the statistic is that overworked federal judges have little
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rate probably remains low enough to warrant additional explanation.
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FN8 I suspect that Supreme Court clerks inform the Justices of the "issues" in certiorari
petitions, and the Justices initially vote on what "issues" they would like to deal with.
Only if the certiorari battle within the Court becomes heated will the Justices look beyond
the "Issues Presented" part of the cert. petitions to the circumstances of the case.
FN9 More precisely still, a fact-laden opinion may reflect a move toward minimum lawmaking acceptability among the Justices signing it.
FN10 Is there any other way to account for the way the Court treated the various
petitioners in the Miranda decision? (It picked a handful of defendants out of some 70
applicants, and made the new Miranda rule applicable to them; the others were
unceremoniously thrown back into prison.)
FN11 But a deconstructionist would argue that it is never necessary for the Supreme
Court to declare a statute unconstitutional. The "interpreting" process can eviscerate any
statute. Indeed, as I argued in 1978, the finding in Brown v. Board of Education that
"separate but equal" was unconstitutional was not only unnecessary, but actually set back
the civil rights movement by at least an entire generation. See S. WASBY, A. D'AMATO &
R. METRAILER, DESEGREGATION FROM BROWN TO ALEXANDER: AN EXPLORATION OF
SUPREME COURT STRATEGIES (1978).
FN12 Nor is this power illusory even though it relies on the language of judicial opinions.
The indeterminacy thesis does not say that language does not affect human behavior; it
only holds that the language of the law does not point with certainty to a decision for one
party rather than another in any given case. The words of a statute indeed affect aggregate
social behavior. Ninety percent of the public may change their conduct as the result of a
statute (but we cannot tell in advance which individuals will fall into the 90%)! There is
no doubt that Supreme Court decisions will affect aggregate social behavior. But when
this is done at the expense of caring about justice to the individual litigants, it is worse
than parasitical upon the adjudicatory role of the Court—it is a usurpation of a role
constitutionally delegated to elected legislators.
FN13 The shrewdness may be more institutional than individual. I am not sure that
individual Justices have consciously intended the Court to become a legislative body.
Rather, this result seems to have been produced by institutional evolution. Caseload
pressures have eroded the original and appellate dockets, and the huge competition for
certiorari slots has forced the Justices to abandon concern for doing justice to the parties.
As a result, perhaps by default, the judges have turned into legislators. Unfortunately, the
new visibility of their role—played up by the media—has made the Court better known
and better accepted by the public than ever before in its history. This new sense of power
then reinforces the legislative tendencies that I have suggested, and each new Justice
learns that legislation is what the Supreme Court is all about.
FN14 The extended essays of Justice Fortas, during his brief stay on the Court, appeared
at the time to me (as a teacher of Constitutional Law) as an aberration. I remember telling
my students that Justice Fortas mistakenly used a case as a vehicle—sometimes even a
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loosely-fitting vehicle—for writing his own philosophy into the public record. What I
was unaware of was that the Fortas approach was then only an exaggeration of what the
other Justices were doing. From today's perspective, the opinions of Justice Fortas have a
very "modern" ring! The Supreme Court Justice of today is a philosopher with a roving
commission.
FN15 Northwestern's Law Review editors, looking over this Article, have asked me
whether I am opposed to judicial activism for ideological or political reasons. Actually, I
rather like a great deal of the Court's social legislation. On freedom of speech, in
particular, the Court has led and educated the country. I have the simple faith that if the
Court were driven primarily by a desire to ensure that justice is done to the parties, the
quality of its decisions would improve. Many of those decisions will anyway have broad
social ramifications. But I think the societal impact of a decision should be its byproduct
rather than constituting the reason for making the decision.
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